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Note
A Standard with No Moxie: The Supreme Court in
Arkansas EducationalTelevision Commission v.
Forbes Allows Government Actors to Choose
Candidates for Television Debates with Little
Restriction
I.

INTRODUCTION

By now, America is surely familiar with Minnesota's newly elected
governor, former Navy Seal and professional wrestler, Jessie
Ventura. 1 Such notoriety is as much a product of his unconventional
background as of his flippancy behind the microphone. "Jessie the
Body" once used the phrase "Democryps and Rebloodicans" in a
mocking comparison of the two political parties to the rival street
gangs, the Crips and the Bloods.2 He also suggested that Hillary
Rodham Clinton, after she referred to his campaign as a "sideshow,"
"maybe ought not leave the White House as often as she used to ....
Bad things seem to happen when she leaves, so she'd be better off
staying back at the White House and taking care of business there,
rather than worrying about politics in Minnesota . . . ," These
comments represent the unorthodox, potentially offensive, yet widely
popular approach that eventually led to Ventura's election victory.4
Ventura's appeal stemmed from not only his rapport with the
I. Ventura was sworn into office on January 4, 1999, as Minnesota's 38th governor.
See Jim Ragsdale, Ventura Assumes Command, CHI. TRIB. , Jan. 5, 1999, § 1, at 6; Pam
Belluck, Bravo, Plain-spoken Drive Make Jessie Ventura a Winner, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIO., Nov. 5, 1998, at 1,available in 1998 WL 20057781. He claimed 37% of the vote
as a Reform party candidate, and this marked the first time that a candidate of Ross
Perot's party won state office. See id.
2.

Dane Smith, Diary of an Upset, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR-TRIO., Nov. 8, 1998,

at 1, available in 1998 WL 6375354. The Crips and the Bloods are the names of two
rival Los Angeles street gangs known for their violence and animosity toward one
another. See id.
3. Id.at 3.
4. See Barry Schlachter, "The Body" Politic Minnesota's Governor-elect, Ex-wrestler
Jesse Ventura Shows Pros of Another Field that They Don't Have a Hammerlock on High
Office, FORTWORTH

STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 5, 1998, at 2, available in 1998 WL

14935964 (noting that Ventura's down-to-earth, low-budget campaign brought out
many voters who would not have voted otherwise).
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boisterous, rowdy professional wrestling fans and sports radio
listeners,5 but also from a rising discontent among Minnesota voters
with the major political parties. 6 While most observers, including
Ventura himself, only slowly warmed to the legitimacy of the
campaign,7 his visibility and outspoken, direct style influenced
voters.8
While Governor Ventura's surprising election reflected a disenchantment in voters' minds with the two major party candidates,9 it is
also an example of an election outcome that has been made more
unlikely as a consequence of a recent United States Supreme Court
decision.'° According to the Court's decision in Arkansas Educational
Television Commission v. Forbes," a public television station airing a
political debate can deny a political candidate, such as Ventura, the
opportunity to enhance his standing through the forum of a televised
debate. 2 The Court ruled that a public television station may exclude a
ballot-qualified candidate 3 from a debate if the station makes a
reasonable 4 and viewpoint-neutral decision as to the candidate's
exclusion.'

Developments since this decision reveal the important consequences
5. See Steve Rushin, Body Language Governor-elect Jesse Ventura's Gigs on Sports
Radio Helped Give Him a Stunning Hold on Voters, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 16, 1998,
at 20.
6. See Schlachter, supra note 4, at 2.
7. Just four days before the election, Ventura called his sports call-in show producer
and, in response to his rising numbers, said: "[W]hat am I gonna do if I win this thing?"
Rushin, supra note 5, at 20.
8. For instance, while hosting his radio show, he voiced his opposition to a plan to
use tax dollars to fund a new Minnesota Twins baseball stadium by saying, "What's his
name, Mike Piazza [baseball player], has signed for 91 million dollars for seven years,
and I'm gonna tell a 31-year-old with a couple of kids that I'm taking her money so Mike
has a place to play?" Id.
9. See Schlachter, supra note 4, at 2 ("There were voters angry at, or bored with, the
two major party candidates-Republican St. Paul Mayor Norm Coleman and liberal
Democrat Hubert Humphrey III.").
10. See infra Part IV.B-C.
11. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998)
(hereinafter Forbes III).
12. See id. at 1640-41.
13. In Arkansas, an independent candidate qualified for the election ballot by filing
petitions signed by 3% of the electors in the district in which the person seeks office,
provided that no more than 2,000 total signatures would be required. See Forbes v.
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 500 (8th Cir. 1996) (hereinafter
Forbes II).
14. See Forbes 11, 118 S. Ct. at 1641; see also infra Part III.B (discussing the Court's
application of the requirement that the decision be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral to
the public television station's decision to exclude Forbes).
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of the Court's reasonable and viewpoint-neutral standard. 5 For one, a
Minnesota public television station protected by this broad rule could
have sponsored a debate without Ventura if the station supported its
decision with minimal statistical evidence, 16 even if that evidence were
arbitrary in nature.' 7 Also, in light of the potentially heightened role of
debates in the current political climate, the decision carries more weight
than one might initially suspect. For instance, in addition to the recent
organization of groups created to promote debates,18 recent scholarly
debate has focused on the possibility of constitutionally requiring
debates as a means of campaign finance reform.' 9 Thus, debates could
influence voter decisions even more significantly in the future, and any
standard that threatens to bar viable candidates deserves heavy scrutinization.2 °
This Note will argue that the public forum standard endorsed by the
Supreme Court does not address the government's role in future
debates with sufficient specificity. Part II of this Note highlights the
development of the public interest standard and the First Amendment
in the broadcasting arena, culminating with a discussion of the Public
Forum Doctrine and its relation to a public television station's right to
deny candidates access to debates.2 ' Part III then traces the development of Arkansas EducationalTelevision Commission v. Forbes in the
15. The Supreme Court decided the case on May 18, 1998. See Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct.
at 1633.
16. For instance, a station could have advanced the campaign's funding difficulties,
see infra notes 267-68 and accompanying text, or preliminary poll figures such as those
released by the Minnesota Poll on September 23, 1998, which reflected that Ventura had
only a 10% showing. See Dane Smith, The Stretch Run: It's Up for Grabs, MINNEAPOLISST. PAUL STAR-TRIB., Nov. 1, 1998, at 6, available in 1998 WL 6374509; infra Part V

(discussing the broad Supreme Court standard now in effect and its impact on third-party
candidates such as Ventura).
17.

Compare Forbes I11, 118 S. Ct. at 1643-44, with Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 1644-

45 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (showing how the majority and dissenting opinions used
different facts surrounding the Arkansas election to support opposing positions).
18. The Minnesota Compact is one such group. See Smith, supra note 2, at 3 (stating

that the Minnesota Compact had a major goal of improving debates for the 1998
elections).
19. See Jeremy Paul, Campaign Reform for the 21st Century: Putting Mouth Where

the Money Is, 30 CONN. L. REV. 779 (1998) (proposing a constitutional amendment
requiring candidates for federal office to appear jointly before voters); see also Edward B.
Foley, Public Debate and Campaign Finance, 30 CONN. L. REV. 817 (1998) (advocating

not only mandatory debates but also a requirement of pre-election messages to voters).
20. The Supreme Court acknowledged the heightened role of debates in Forbes,
noting that debates are regarded as the only time where a significant portion of the
American public truly focuses on the election.
also infra Part II.C.3.
21. See infra Part II.

See Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 1640; see
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lower courts, discusses the Supreme Court's endorse-ment of the
public forum doctrine, and provides an overview of the dissent's
disapproval with the Court's analysis.22 Part IV suggests that the
Supreme Court's public forum analysis needs further clarification.23
As a possible solution, Part IV will also endorse a more specific
standard for government actors and proposes "established, objective
criteria" that will limit government actors' subjective leeway in debate
decisions.24 Part V analyzes the impact of the standard set by the
Court on future debates and emphasizes the potential growing
importance of political debates sponsored by state actors.25
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of BroadcastRights and the Public Interest
Standard
Federal regulation of broadcast rights began in the early twentieth
century with the passage of the Radio Act of 191226 and the later,
more developed Radio Act of 1927 ("Radio Acts"). 27 The Radio Act
of 1927 created the Federal Radio Commission ("FRC"), which
regulated the airwaves as the predecessor to the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"). 28 The FRC under the Radio Acts
regulated broadcasters according to the "Fairness Doctrine., 29 The
2 2. See infra Part III.
2 3. See infra Part IV.B.
24. See infra Part IV.C-D.
25. See infra Part V.
26. See Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302, repealed by Radio Act of 1927, ch.
169, 44 Stat. 1162. The Radio Act of 1912 gave the Secretary of Commerce the
responsibility to provide order in the area of radio transmissions. See Adrian Cronauer,
The Fairness Doctrine: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 57
(1994). Court decisions interpreting the Act, however, stripped the Secretary of
Commerce of the power to place conditions on licenses. See id.
27. See Thomas F. Ackley, Political Candidates' First Amendment Rights Can Be
Trumped by Journalists' Editorial Rights: Candidates Barred from Public Television
Debate in Marcus v. Iowa Public Television, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 475, 484 (1998).
Congress mainly passed the later Radio Act in response to the meager effects of the
earlier legislation and the great increase in the number of frequencies through the early
1920s. See Gayle S. Ecabert, Comment, The Demise of the Fairness Doctrine: A
Constitutional Reevaluation of Content-Based Broadcasting Regulations, 56 U. CINN. L.
REV. 999, 1004 (1998). A series of national radio conferences and the resulting
recommendations ultimately led to the drafting of a bill that later became the Radio Act
of 1927. See id.
28. See Ackley, supra note 27, at 484 (citing Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat.
1162; Cronauer, supra note 26, at 58).
29. See id.; see also Ecabert, supra note 27, at 1005. This doctrine required that "[a]
station must permit reasonable opportunity for the presentation of views which contrast
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doctrine required that broadcasters fairly cover public issues by
ensuring that the public hear contrasting viewpoints regarding the
topics presented.3"
The Communications Act of 1934 ("the Act"), which governs
broadcasters' rights today, updated the Radio Acts and established
requirements that must be met every three years for the renewal of
individual broadcast licenses." Under the Act, Congress transferred
the regulatory power of the FRC to the FCC. 32 The new legislation
required the FCC to grant broadcasting license renewals based upon a
public interest standard.33 According to the standard, the FCC should
renew licenses based on whether34a station furthers the "convenience
and necessity" of the community.
As the means for determining whether a broadcaster acts in the
public interest, however, the FCC originally avoided developing and
applying the public interest ideals of convenience and necessity.3 5
Instead, the FCC promulgated the "fairness doctrine" of the Radio
Acts as the means for determining whether a broadcaster retained its
license. 3 6 In 1959, after independently applying the "fairness
doctrine" for decades, Congress codified the FCC's policies when it
amended the Act of 1934 by specifically promulgating the "fairness
doctrine." 3 7 This doctrine remained the standard for broadcaster
decisions and the focus of considerable development in the courts until
1985." 8
those of persons who originally presented a controversial issue of public importance."
Ackley, supra note 27, at 484 (quoting PHILIP KEIRSTEAD, MODERN PUBLIC AFFAIRS
PROGRAMMING 167 (1979)).
30. See Ackley, supra note 27, at 484; see also Ecabert, supra note 27, at 1001.
3 1. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 307(a), 307(d), 309(a)
(1994). The FCC now grants licenses for eight year terms. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 307(c)(1)

(West Supp. 1998).
32. See Ackley, supra note 27, at 485; see also Cronauer, supra note 26, at 58.
33. See Erick Howard, Debating PBS: Public Broadcasting and the Power to Exclude
Political Candidates from Televised Debates, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 435, 443 (citing 47

U.S.C. § 309(a)).
34. See id. Congress does not delineate the meanings of these terms. See id.

35. See Ackley, supra note 27, at 484-85. The Communications Act may set forth the
terms "convenience and necessity" as the standard; however, the FCC carried over the
fairness doctrine from the Radio Acts as the governing principle until Congress
formally rejected the doctrine in 1987. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 485; see also Cronauer, supra note 26, at 60; Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064.
38. See Ackley, supra note 27, at 490. The Supreme Court considered the fairness
doctrine on a number of occasions in the 1970s. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
the Supreme Court found the fairness doctrine constitutional. 395 U.S. 367, 386-89
(1969). In that case, a radio host employed by Red Lion alleged on-air that a certain
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In 1987, however, the FCC completely reversed its position and
abruptly abandoned the "'fairness doctrine."39 The FCC determined
that the "fairness doctrine" actually dissuaded broadcasters from
addressing certain topics for fear that contrary viewpoints would
require exorbitant time and expense. n° The standard also lost much of
its purpose because technological advances created numerous venues
for individual expression and the potential disservice toward
unrepresented individuals was balanced by the broadcasting
opportunities on other mediums.4 Consequently, the FCC formally
rejected the "fairness doctrine," and the more general public interest
standard has continued as the measuring stick for granting license
renewals to broadcasters.42
Thus, while the fairness doctrine no longer applies, certain
provisions of the Communications Act as carried forth by Congress in
the code continue to regulate access to the airwaves and endorse the
public interest standard.43 Section 309(a) sets out the language of the
Act of 1934 when it requires the FCC to consider "the public interest,
convenience, and necessity" when renewing or granting licenses.44
author was a Communist. See id. at 371. The FCC required that Red Lion provide the
author with the opportunity to respond to the attacks and the Supreme Court upheld the
decision. See id. at 372, 386. Later, the Supreme Court determined that the fairness
doctrine does not provide an individual or a group the right to demand use of broadcast
facilities for advertisements. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 113, 132 (1973).
39. See Ackley, supra note 27, at 490 (quoting Ecabert, supra note 27, at 1009-10).
The FCC "made a one hundred and eighty degree change in its position." Id.
40. See id; see also Ecabert, supra note 27, at 1010.
4 1. See Ackley, supra 27, at 490; see also Cronauer, supra note 26, at 72.
42. See Ackley, supra note 27, at 490-91. The FCC "formally renounced the Fairness
Doctrine" in 1987. Cronauer, supra note 26, at 62. This statement followed the
Supreme Court's stance in FCC v. League of Women Voters that the Court would be
forced to review the fairness doctrine's constitutional basis if the Commission found the
doctrine had "the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing" the free expression of
ideas by broadcasters. Id. at 61 (quoting FCC v. League of Women's Voters, 468 U.S.
364, 378-79 n. 12 (1984)). Since 1987, Congressional attempts to enact the FCC's
previous interpretation of the fairness doctrine into law were opposed by Presidents
Reagan and Bush, and more recent attempts under President Clinton have also been
unsuccessful. See Ackley, supra note 27, at 491.
43. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 1998) (providing the requirements
for license renewal); 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994) (setting forth the "equal time" doctrine that
governs broadcasters in decisions regarding candidates for political office). The
Communications Act of 1934 in general is codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613
(1991).
44. 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(a). The public interest standard's constitutionality rests on
the "scarcity" rationale established in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. See Charles
W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the
Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1688 (1997) (citing
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)). The Supreme Court justified
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While Congress did not provide a definition of the obligations to the
community that the broadcaster must meet to fulfill the requirements of
the standard,45 the code does specifically discuss a broadcaster's
obligations toward political candidates.46 Section 315 of the Act
establishes equal opportunity requirements as they specifically apply to
a broadcaster's decision to allow air time for the candidates.47 Section
315 states that "[i]f any licensee shall permit any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting
station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates
for that office in the use of such broadcasting station. 48
B. Common Law Development of the Public Interest Standard

The courts generally have interpreted the Communications Act
broadly and given wide latitude to broadcasters in determining the
public interest.4 9 The Supreme Court acknowledged the broadcaster's
discretion when it noted that neither Congress nor the First Amendment limited a private network's journalistic freedom. 0 The Court
the regulatory power of the government because more people want to broadcast than
there are available frequencies. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-89. Thus, the scarcity of
broadcast frequencies dictates that "of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting
that has received the most limited First Amendment protection." Logan, supra, at 1688
(quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978)).
45. See Ackley supra note 27, at 492 (citing Philip Keirstead, Modern Public Affairs
Programming 154 (1979)).
46. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 315.
47. See id.
48. Id. The equal opportunity doctrine does not require a station to offer air-time in
general; rather, it simply requires that if a broadcaster allows one candidate to use the
station, then all candidates must be afforded the same opportunity. See Ackley, supra
note 27, at 493. This requirement of equal opportunity may be satisfied if the station
airing a debate between only the two major party candidates also provides other air time
for the remaining candidates. See id. at 519. The Eighth Circuit, however, dismissed an
opportunity to determine whether other air time fulfills the § 315 requirement when it
concluded that equal opportunity matters were best left to the FCC. See DeYoung v.
Patten, 898 F.2d 628, 633-34 (8th Cir. 1990).
49. See Howard, supra note 33, at 444-45 (citing Massachusetts Universalist
Convention v. Hildreth and Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950); Gemini
Enterprises, Inc v. WFMY Television Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559 (M.D. NC 1979)). In
Massachusetts Universalist Convention, the First Circuit determined that a "licensee is
obliged to reserve to himself the final decision as to what programs will best serve the
public interest." Massachusetts Universalist Convention, 183 F.2d at 500. In Gemini,
the court posited that broadcasters are "gatekeepers who control much of the flow of
information in our society," and as such, "the First Amendment protects the ability of
these gatekeepers to make decisions without government interference." Gemini, 470 F.
Supp. at 568.
50. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110
(1973). In Columbia Broadcasting, the Democratic National Committee and the
Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace ("BEM") brought suit alleging violation
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more recently endorsed this view when it stated that television
broadcasters must be given the "widest journalistic freedom" in line
with their public responsibilities."
Though courts have consistently affirmed the availability of private
broadcaster discretion, broadcaster discretion does not go
unchecked.52 For instance, the Court has stated that "[i]t is the right of
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount."53 Thus, despite the desire to allow private broadcasters
wide discretion, the Court has expressed a willingness to limit
broadcasters in instances where their decisions deter the First Amendment's purpose of protecting the marketplace of ideas as a source of
truth, and instead act as a vehicle for market monopolization by the
government or by a private licensee.54
C. The Development of Public BroadcastingRegulation
While private broadcasting has been the subject of legislation and
litigation since the turn of the century.,55 public broadcasting has been
the subject of much less scrutiny by the courts because it did not exist
as a separate entity until approximately thirty years ago.56 As a general
rule, public networks have enjoyed the same journalistic freedom in
their programming decisions as their private station counterparts.57
of the "fairness doctrine" because a television station refused to sell commercial air time
to BEM. See id. at 98. The Supreme Court upheld the FCC's decision that "a broadcaster
who meets his public obligation to provide full and fair coverage of public issues is not
required to accept editorial advertisements." Id. at 97, 130-31.
5 1. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 378; infra notes 67-71 and
accompanying text, for a more thorough discussion of the case and its ramifications.
52. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
53. Id.
54. See id. (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 7475 (1964)); see also supra note 44 (briefly explaining the decision and providing an
example of the Court using the fairness doctrine as a tool against unbridled broadcaster
discretion).
55. See supra Part II.A-B (discussing regulation and common law development of
broadcast rights).
56. See infra Part II.C.1-2 (discussing the creation of the Public Broadcasting Act of
1967).
57. See Forbes I1, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1646 (1998) (noting that "noncommercial,
educational stations generally have exercised the same journalistic independence as
commercial networks"); Rebecca L. Torrey, First Amendment Claims Against Public
Broadcasters: Testing the Public's Right to a Balanced Presentation, 1989 DUKE L.J.
1386, 1394 ("[Tlhe original 1934 Communications Act provisions, along with
subsequent legislation directed at public broadcasters, cover public stations."). Public
television stations differ mostly from private stations in their means of funding and the
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Nonetheless, state-owned networks have been subject to the scrutiny
of both the FCC through the Communications Act of 1934 58and more
recent legislation specifically directed at public broadcasters.
1. The Public Broadcasting Act
Although Congress provided funding for the development of
commercial television stations through the Educational Television Act
of 1962, 59 public broadcasting did not formally exist until Congress
created the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967,60 which amended the
Communications Act of 1934.61 The Public Broadcasting Act
established the Corporation for Public Broadcasting ("CPB") and set
forth guidelines protecting public broadcasters from federal
government intervention.62 The public broadcast stations in turn are
governed by FCC regulation and statutory requirements; the stations
receive funds contingent upon compliance with these provisions.63
Congress provided the CPB with the authority to distribute these
funds, allocated annually by Congress, 64 for the improvement of
broadcast facilities and production of "high-quality," "creativity," and
support they receive from the government. See Telephone Interview with Bill Handley,
Vice President of Minnesota Production, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Mar. 22, 1999).
Public stations, as indicated by their name, receive support from state government and
from the public at large. See id. In general, three types of public television stations
exist, but all three receive at least some financial support from the government. See id.
Thus, they receive slightly different treatment than private stations, which are owned by
private individuals. See id.
5 8. See Torrey, supra note 57, at 1394.
59. See id. at 1386 n.51 (citing Educational Television Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87447, 76 Stat. 64). For a more thorough discussion of the development of public
television and origin of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, see FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
60. See Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (1967) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§
390-99 (West 1991 & West Supp. 1998)). Congress authorized this federal funding
because the Carnegie report found that the "instructional, educational, and cultural
purposes" of public television "serve[] the public interest." Torrey, supra note 57, at
1395.
61. See Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1991 & Supp. 1998)); Torrey, supra note 57, at 1934 n.50.
62. See 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(7) (1992); 47 U.S.C. § 396(b) (1991). The Corporation
for Public Broadcasting ("CPB") serves as an "intermediary" between the federal
government and public stations in order to distance government involvement. See
Torrey, supra note 57, at 1396 (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,
388-89 (1984)). In order to make available these federally funded programs, the CPB
established the Public Broadcasting Service ("PBS") and National Public Radio ("NPR").
See id. at 1396.
63. See Torrey, supra note 57, at 1398.
64. See id. at 1395 (citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(k)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1989) (amended
1992) (establishing a Public Broadcasting fund).
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64
in its programming. 65
"excellence"

2. Judicial Interpretation of the Standard
The Supreme Court did not consider public broadcasting rights in
any context until 1984, when it evaluated the constitutionality of a
provision of the Public Broadcasting Act forbidding federally
subsidized stations from editorializing.66 In FCC v. League of
Women Voters,67 the majority found the statute overly broad because it
banned speech by private stations on topics completely independent of
government involvement.68 The Court noted, however, that this
decision did not reflect a judgment of whether a similar statute
prohibiting stations operated by state or local governments from
editorializing would be unconstitutional. 69 Thus, the Court only
concluded that private stations have a right to express their views free
of government intervention,7 ° and it refrained from making a decision
on similar congressional limitations of public television stations.7'
Consequently, until recently,72 the courts allowed public broadcasters
the same journalistic discretion as their private television
counterparts 73

3. Public Broadcasting Rights in the Context of Political Debates
In recent cases involving political debates on public television
stations, however, courts have applied different standards to public
television broadcasters in their decisions regarding candidates for

65. See 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1994). Regardless of these duties, Congress
explicitly did not create the CPB as a United States governmental agency or
establishment. See id. § 396(b).
66. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 395 (1984) (discussing
constitutionality of Public Broadcasting Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95
Stat. 730, amending § 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129,
81 Stat. 365, 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399).
67. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
68. See id. at 395. The suit was brought by Pacifica Foundation, a nonprofit
corporation owning noncommercial educational broadcasting stations in various
metropolitan areas. See id. at 370. Its licensees operated by virtue of the grants
provided by CPB, and brought this action challenging the constitutionality of the
limitations placed on the stations by § 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act. See id.
69. See id. at 394-95 n.24.
70. See id. at 395.
7 1. See id. at 394-95 n.24.
72. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing recent cases concerning public broadcasting
rights with respect to political debates), see also infra Part III (discussing the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998)).
73. See Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 1646.
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televised debates.74 While private networks continue to be guided by
the public interest standard in their debate decisions, public stations
face potential accusations of subjectively selecting candidates worthy
of the debate. 75 Thus, in its capacity as a state actor, the public
station's programming decisions may be construed as either
government censorship or government endorsement of the station's
content while such fears are inapplicable to private broadcasters.76
Additionally, the Supreme Court has emphasized the heightened
importance of free speech when it involves restrictions on candidates
for political office.77 The Court has stated that debate on public issues

"should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open, 78 and that the
constitutional guarantee regarding free speech "has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political
office., 79 Thus, much debate has focused on whether the public
interest standard 8 adequately governs public television broadcasters in
the context of political candidate debates when Section 31581 and the
public forum doctrine 82 provide alternative methods of regulation.83
74. See Marcus v. Iowa Pub. Television, 97 F.3d 1137, 1144 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a public television debate is a designated public forum and determining
that the station's decision to limit a political debate to newsworthy candidates rather
than all candidates was in the public's interest); Forbes H, 93 F.3d 497, 504-05 (8th Cir.
1996) (station's content-based decision to exclude Libertarian candidate did not violate
First or Fourteenth Amendment); Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecomms. Comm'n, 917
F.2d 486, 488-89 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (debate was designated public forum from which
candidate could not be excluded on the basis that the station did not consider the
candidate politically viable).
75. See Forbes III, 118 S. Ct. at 1647.
76. See id. "[A]d hoc decisions about the political content of its programs
necessarily increases the risk of government censorship and propaganda in a way that
protection of privately owned broadcasters does not." Id.
77. See id. at 1640; see also CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981)
(emphasizing the importance of opportunities for candidates to express their views so
that the public may make informed, intelligent decisions based on the candidate's
personal qualities and positions on vital issues).
78. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995) (citation
omitted).
79. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).
80. See supra Parts II.A-B (discussing development of broadcast rights and public
interest standard).
8 1. See supra Part II.A (discussing "equal time" doctrine).
82. See infra Part II.D (discussing public forum doctrine).
83. See Marcus v. Iowa Pub. Television, 97 F.3d 1137, 1141 (8th Cir. 1996)
(applying the public forum doctrine as the standard for determining whether a public
television station may limit the number of candidates appearing on a televised debate);
Forbes 11, 93 F.3d 497, 504 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying the public forum doctrine and
finding that the debates constitute designated public fora); Chandler v. Georgia Pub.
Telecomms. Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486, 488-89 (1lth Cir. 1990) (ignoring a public forum
analysis in favor of the public interest standard); Ackley, supra note 27, at 524-25
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D. The Public Forum Doctrine
If a court determines that public television stations serve as
government actors when choosing candidates for debate,8 4 then the
court may overlook the governing power of the FCC and instead
evaluate a public station's decisions in terms of the First Amendment's
protection.8 5 If applied, this constitutional protection would not
guarantee government property access to any parties that wish to
exercise their right to free speech.8 6 Limits to this access exist and, as
a means to define these limits, the Supreme Court originally adopted a
public forum analysis for situations where the government's interest in
restricting the use of the property to a particular purpose outweighs the
interest of other parties hoping to use the property. 87 Thus, the
government can control access to speech on its property only if the
relevant forum allows such control by its nature. 88
The Supreme Court has identified the following three types of fora
within the public forum analysis: the traditional public forum, the
designated public forum, and the nonpublic forum. 89 The first forum,
(endorsing § 315's equal opportunity protection as the appropriate regulatory tool for
public broadcasters); Howard, supra note 33, at 453-54 (supporting the public forum
analysis, but claiming that a more lenient application actually protects First
Amendment rights because public television broadcasters will not be dissuaded from
airing candidate debates).
84. Many courts and commentators determined that public television stations acted
on behalf of the state and thus were subject to First Amendment scrutiny. See Forbes v.
Arkansas Educ. Television Communication Network Found., 22 F.3d 1423, 1428 (8th
Cir. 1994) (hereinafter "Forbes r'); DeYoung v. Patten, 898 F.2d 628, 631-32 (8th Cir.
1990), overruled in part by Forbes 1, 22 F.3d at 1423; Torrey, supra note 57, at 1403-04
(determining that the editorial and operating decisions of public stations licensed to the
government are state actions for First Amendment purposes). This stance was validated
by the Supreme Court's decision in Forbes v. Arkansas Educational Television
Commission when the Court applied a First Amendment public forum analysis to the
public television station's candidate debate decisions. See Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. 1633,
1641-43 (1998).
85. See Ackley, supra note 27, at 494 (asserting that the FCC has failed to revoke a
license in 20 years and, as a result, "an examination of First Amendment case law and
how it impacts broadcasters is now in order.")
86. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 80001 (1985). In Cornelius, the legal defense fund brought suit against the government
alleging that the government's exclusion of legal defense and political advocacy
organizations from "a charity drive aimed at federal employees" violated the First
Amendment. Id. at 790. The Supreme Court determined that the charity drive was not a
designated public forum. See id. at 804-05.
87. See id. at 800.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 802; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
45-47 (1983). In Perry, a union challenged the constitutionality of an exclusivity
clause in a contract between the school district and its union that granted the union

1999]

Arkansas Educational Television Comm'n v. Forbes

777

the traditional public forum, consists of places that have long been
"devoted to assembly and debate" and includes venues such as public
streets and parks.9" In these "quintessential public forums," the
government may only prohibit speech activity under strict
circumstances. 91 To employ a content-based decision on the regulated
speech, the state must show that its regulation is narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state interest.92
Alternatively, the government may create a designated public
forum 93 by designating a place or means of communication for use by
the public for assembly, for use by speakers, or for discussing
particular subjects.9 4 Because the government has designated this
second type of forum, the Constitution forbids exclusions from these
95
places unless the exclusion serves a compelling state interest.
Applying the public forum doctrine, the Supreme Court determined
that a state university established a designated or limited public forum
by adopting a policy that allowed registered student groups access to
meeting facilities.96 The Court also found that a state statute requiring
open school board meetings created a designated public forum. 97
Certain government property that is neither a traditional nor
designated public forum may still receive First Amendment protection
exclusive access to the school's mail facilities. See id. at 39-41. The Court held that the
school mail system constituted a nonpublic forum because the school only opened the
forum to selective access. See id. at 47.
90. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; see also Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (eliciting that streets and parks "have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions").
91. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
92. See id. In traditional public fora, any restrictions on "the time, place, and manner
of expression" must be "content-neutral," must be "narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest," and must "leave open ample alternative channels of
communication." Id. Any restrictions, however, on the time, place, and manner of
expression in designated public fora need only be reasonable. See id. at 46.
93. Courts use the terms "limited public forum" and "designated public forum"
interchangeably. In the interest of consistency, except where quoted, this Note will
refer to such a forum as a "designated public forum."
94. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46 and n.7).
95. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. While the scrutiny applied to a content-based
decision by a state actor is the same for traditional and designated public fora, the
scrutiny differs for restrictions of time, place, and manner. See supra note 92 (noting
differences in scrutiny).
96. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (determining that the
university created a forum when it left the property "generally open" to all registered
student groups, and as such the property was open to a class of speakers).
97. See Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 174-75 and n.6 (1976).
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as a nonpublic forum, the third type of forum. 98 The First
Amendment, however, does not guarantee absolute access to the
property merely because the government owns or controls it.9 9
Rather, these government-owned "nonpublic fora" may be subject to
government restriction so long as the restrictions are reasonable and
viewpoint-neutral." Thus, the government maintains the right to use
its property for its intended purpose in the same manner as a private
land owner.1 ' In applying this forum analysis, the Supreme Court
has held that the government, by running a charity drive authorized by
executive order and aimed at federal employees, created a nonpublic
forum because the government limited access to the forum and the
limited access promoted a more efficient workplace. °2 Moreover, the
Court has also concluded that school mail facilities consisted of a
nonpublic forum because the mail system was not open generally to
the public.1"3
E. The Eleventh CircuitEndorses the Public Interest Standard
The public forum doctrine provided three types of public fora, each
with a different standard, for the Supreme Court when analyzing cases
where a state actor restricted speech on its property. 10 4 Recent
decisions by different federal courts of appeal, however, reflect a
growing confusion regarding whether the public forum analysis
applies to public broadcasters when they limit the number of
candidates invited to appear on televised debates.105
In at least one circuit, the court used the public interest standard to
deny an independent candidate access to a televised debate on public
television. The Eleventh Circuit in Chandler v. Georgia Public

98. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
99. See id. (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S.
114, 129 (1981)).
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
805-06 (1985).
103. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46-47.
104. See supra Part II.D (discussing the public forum doctrine); supra note 92
(explaining the slight differences between the traditional public forum and designated
public forum standards).
105. See, e.g., Forbes H, 93 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1996); Chandler v. Georgia Pub.
Telecomm. Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir. 1990). Neither of these two decisions
concentrated on § 315 and its equal opportunity requirement; however, some
commentators believe that this statute's protection amply regulates public broadcasters
decisions. See Ackley, supra note 27, at 516-21.
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0 6
Telecommunications Commission1
held that a public television
station could refuse the candidate access to the debate without violating
the candidate's First Amendment rights. 10 7 In Chandler, two
Libertarian candidates for political office in Georgia filed suit against
the state's public television station, the Georgia Public
Telecommunications Commission ("GPTC"), because the station
invited only the Democratic
and Republican candidates to a series of
08
1
debates.
televised
In a succinct opinion,' °9 the court of appeals employed the public
interest standard in finding for the GPTC." ° The court of appeals
first noted that the GPTC did not constitute a pure marketplace of
ideas."' Instead, the GPTC was created for the narrow purpose "of
providing educational, instructional, and public broadcasting
services. ' 2 Consequently, the state could regulate the content of its
programs to achieve its primary function of providing educational and
instructional broadcasts for the citizens of Georgia." 3 The court next
noted that the GPTC was regulated by the duty to provide
programming in the public's best interest." 4 While the court found
that the station "regulated content" by deciding to air certain candidates
at the exclusion of others, it determined that the GPTC's decision was
reasonable, not viewpoint restrictive, and helped to achieve GPTC's
primary function." 5 In allowing public broadcasters broad discretion,

106. Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecomm. Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486 (11 th Cir. 1990).
107. See id. at 488-89.
108. See id. at 487-88. The district court, relying on the First Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection grounds, enjoined the defendants from
televising the debates unless the station included the Libertarian candidates. See id. at
488.
109. The court felt the need for a prompt resolution before the debates and delivered
its opinion two days before the first scheduled debate. See id. at 488.
110. See id. at 488.
111. See id. The court admitted that "[wiere GPTC a medium open to all who have a
message, whatever its nature, GPTC would function as a marketplace of ideas." Id.
(citing Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, (5th Cir. 1982)
(Rubin, J., concurring). The court, however, did not find GPTC to be such a medium.
See id.
112. Id. (citation omitted).
113. See id. The court of appeals emphasized, however, "that, public television
stations must, no matter what may be the wishes of state government personalities,
abide by the dictates of 47 U.S.C. § 315 regarding fairness and balance or lose their
licenses." Id. at 489.
114. See id. at 488.
115. See id. at 489. The court determined that GPTC's decision to include only the
Democratic and Republican candidates was valid because GPTC believed that such a
debate was in the best interest of the citizens of Georgia. See id. Essentially, the court
used the nonpublic forum standard without explicitly addressing it as such. See supra
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the court emphasized its reluctance to "establish a precedent that would
require public television stations to forego the broadcast of
controversial views touching upon important public issues... lest the
airing of such programs require a cacophony of differing views on
'
each subject."116
III. DISCUSSION
A. Facts of the Case and the Lower Courts' Opinions

The Eleventh Circuit's subtle endorsement of the public interest
standard indicated that courts may be willing to look beyond the First
Amendment where public stations choose candidates for debates.' 7
The tide shifted, however, in Forbes v. Arkansas Educational
Television Commission, 1 8 where the Eighth Circuit applied the public
forum analysis to require a public television station to give access to an
independent candidate." 9 In Forbes, the appellate court determined
that a government-controlled television station cannot deny a third
party access to a televised debate on the subjective ground that the
candidate is not viable. 20 The suit sprung from a decision by the
Arkansas Educational Television Commission ("AETC") to broadcast
a debate on October 22, 1992 between the Democratic and Republican
candidates for the Congressional seat in the Third District of
Arkansas.12' Two months after the AETC invited the candidates from
Part II.D (recognizing that certain government property can be constitutionally
controlled so long as such control is "reasonable" and "viewpoint-neutral").
116. Chandler, 917 F.2d at 489-90.
117. See supra Part II.E (discussing Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecomms. Comm'n,
917 F.2d 486 (11 th Cir. 1990)). Even if the Eleventh Circuit did not directly endorse the
public interest standard, at the very least the court of appeals considered the debate
decision reasonable and viewpoint neutral, which meets the qualifications of the
nonpublic forum. See Chandler, 917 F.2d at 489.
118. Forbes 11, 93 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1996).
119. See id. In Forbes I, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision to
dismiss Forbes' complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Forbes 1, 22 F.3d 1423, 1430 (8th Cir. 1994). The court held
that a public-forum analysis correctly governed the case, and that the determination of
whether the debate constituted a designated public forum was for the factfinder to decide.
See id. at 1429-30. The Eighth Circuit, however, affirmed the district court's rejection
of Forbes' 47 U.S.C. § 315 claim. See id. at 1427-28. The court held that a § 315 equal
opportunity claim does not create a private cause of action, and thus a party may only
pursue such a claim through the procedure proscribed by the FCC. See id.
120. See Forbes I, 93 F.2d at 500.
1 21. See id. The AETC actually chose to air five debates, one for the Senate and one
each for the four congressional seats in Arkansas. See Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1637
(1998). The AETC, which owns and operates Arkansas' five noncommercial television
networks, limited the debates to two candidates because the debate format allowed
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the two major parties, Ralph Forbes obtained the necessary 2,000
signatures required by Arkansas law and qualified as an independent
candidate for the election day ballot. 2 2 Mr. Forbes then requested
permission from the AETC to participate in the debate, but AETC
denied the request because, as Executive Director Susan Howarth
explained, it was in the best interest of 1the
23 viewers that the debate be
limited to the candidates already invited.
Three days before the debate, Forbes filed suit against the AETC
seeking a preliminary injunction warranting his appearance in the
debate. 2 4 The district court and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit denied this request, and the district court later
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.1 25 The Eighth
Circuit reversed, however, holding that AETC is a state actor, and that
the exclusion must survive First Amendment scrutiny under a publicforum analysis.' 26 The appellate court left the determination of
whether the debate constituted a designated public forum or nonpublic
forum to the factfinder in order to determine the necessary standard of
First Amendment scrutiny. 27 Additionally, the court remanded the
had provided no reason
case to the district court because the defendant
28
for excluding Forbes from the debate. 1
On remand, the district court ruled that AETC was a nonpublic
forum as a matter of law. 29 The jury then considered the facts and
found that the AETC's decision was viewpoint-neutral and that it was
not the result of outside political pressure. 3 ° Thus, the district court
approximately 53 minutes of questions and answers for each of the one hour debates.
See id.
122. See Forbes 11, 93 F.3d at 500. State law requires a candidate to file petitions
signed by at least 3% of the qualified voters in the district in which the candidate seeks
office, but no more than 2,000 signatures are required. See id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. §
7-7-103(c)(1)). Forbes previously ran for the Republican nomination for Arkansas
Lieutenant Governor in both 1986 and 1990. See Forbes I11, 118 S. Ct. at 1644-45.
Here, however, he qualified as an independent candidate under state law for this election.
See Forbes H, 93 F.3d at 500.
123. See Forbes III, 118 S. Ct. at 1638.
124. See id.
125. See id; see also supra note 119 (discussing history of the case).
126. See Forbes III, 118 S. Ct. at 1683.
127. See Forbes 1, 22 F.3d 1423, 1429-30 (8th Cir. 1994).
128. See id. at 1430 (noting that AETN had not yet filed an answer).
129. See Forbes 11, 93 F.3d 497, 500 (8th Cir. 1996). The district court took this
decision out of the hands of the jury and presented only the limited issues of fact
necessary to determine if the station's actions conformed with the First Amendment
requirements of a nonpublic forum. See id. at 500-01.
130. See id. at 501. The jury submitted these two conclusions on special verdict. See
id. The jury addressed the outside political pressure because the defendants asserted at
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entered judgment for AETC and Forbes appealed. 31
After entertaining a series of procedural issues, 132 the Eighth Circuit
1 33
vigorously opposed the district court's public forum decision.
First, the appellate court determined that the forum is defined by the
access sought by the speaker and that, when a speaker pursues access
to a certain means of communication, the analysis should focus on that
particular forum only.' 34 Thus, the court characterized the debate,
rather than the station at large, as the relevant forum.'35
After explaining the background of the public forum doctrine and
stating that no bright line test exists for determining the appropriate
designation, the appellate court asserted that a debate constitutes a
designated public forum. 136 The Eighth Circuit analogized the debate
to the forum in Widmar v. Vincent, where the Supreme Court
concluded that a university created a designated public forum by
making its facilities available to registered student groups for
expressive purposes. 117 The court equated the opening of the
university's facilities to AETC's decision to open its facilities to a
particular group, which were the qualified candidates for the Third
Congressional seat.'38
trial that Forbes could recover only upon a finding that outside pressure influenced
AETC. See id. The court of appeals did not mention whether the district court
specifically examined reasonableness. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 501-02. The court first found the special interrogatories presented to
the jury did not violate Forbes' First Amendment rights because they were sufficiently
clear. See id. at 501. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding evidence that Forbes contended would have proved that the
husband of the debate's producer was prejudiced against him. See id. at 501-02.
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit determined that the question of which forum is
appropriate is a mixture of law and fact and, in First Amendment cases with questions of
both law and fact, the court's review is de novo. See id. at 502-03.
133. See id. at 503. The court went so far as to state that "[t]he choice between the
two forums suggested is not a difficult one." Id. The court later stated "without
reservation . . . that the forum in this case, the debate, is a limited public forum." Id. at
504.
134. See id. at 503 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473
U.S. 788, 801 (1985)).
135. See id.
136. See id. at 504. The court described the public forum as "limited" instead of the
more commonly chosen term "designated." See id.; see also supra note 93 (noting that
courts use these two words interchangeably to describe a forum type).
137. See Forbes II, 93 F.3d at 504 (discussing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
267-68 (1981)); see also supra note 96 and accompanying text (summarizing the
Supreme Court's holding in Widmar v. Vincent).
138. See id. The Eighth Circuit also distinguished Forbes H from two cases in which
the Supreme Court found that the government opened nonpublic fora. See id. In both of
the cases, the Eighth Circuit determined that the fora were not created to provide an
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Applying the appropriate First Amendment scrutiny,139 the Eighth
Circuit determined that AETC's decision was "neither compelling nor
narrowly tailored."' 4 ° While the appellate court agreed that political
"viability" is the type of journalistic discretion ordinarily afforded
broadcasters, the court emphasized that these journalists were
employees of the government and thus could not base their decisions
4
on subjective determinations such as political viability.' '
Consequently, the court held that Forbes was entitled to judgment and
remanded the case to the district court in order to determine
damages.142 The Supreme Court granted certiori first to resolve the
conflict between the Eighth Circuit's use of the public interest standard
and the Eleventh Circuit's use of the public forum doctrine in
Chandler,and second because of the magnitude of the issue before the
Court. 143

B. The Majority Opinion

Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, endorsed the public
forum doctrine' 44 but reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision on the
grounds that the Eighth Circuit had wrongly classified the type of
public forum and hence applied the incorrect level of scrutiny. 45 The
Court held that the debate was a nonpublic forum and that AETC's
exclusion of Forbes withstood constitutional scrutiny because the
decision was both "reasonable" and "viewpoint-neutral."'"
The Court analyzed the issue of whether Forbes' exclusion from the
opportunity for expression.

See id. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and

Educational Fund, the government designed the forum to minimize workplace
disruptions. See 473 U.S. 788, 805 (1985). In Perry Educational Association v. Perry
Local Educators Association, the forum, which was the school's internal mail system,

provided for a form of expression "relating to school business." See 460 U.S. 37
(1983). The debate by AETC, however, was staged solely as a means for candidates to
express their views.

See Forbes 11, 93 F.3d at 504; see also supra notes 86-95

(discussing Cornelius and Perry in more detail).
139. When a state actor opens a designated public forum, its content-based decisions
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See supra notes 92-97
and accompanying text.
140. Forbes I1, 93 F.3d at 505. But see Marcus v. Iowa Pub. Television, 97 F.3d
1137, 1141 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding a public station's exclusion of a candidate passed
First Amendment scrutiny because the station found the candidate non-newsworthy).
141. See Forbes H, 93 F.3d at 504-05.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See
See
See
See

id. at 505.
Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1638 (1998).
id. at 1639-40
id. at 1644; see also supra notes 118-42 and accompanying text (outlining

the Eighth Circuit's rationale).
146.

See Forbes, 93 F.3d at 1641.
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debate was consistent with the First Amendment in three steps. 4 7 The
Court first determined that the "special characteristics of candidate
debates" qualify the debates as some type of forum.148 In doing so,

the Court reviewed general broadcast principles 4 9 and concluded that
in most instances the broad nature of editorial discretion warrants a
system of minimal interference with broadcaster decisions. 5 ° The
majority, however, determined that candidate debates provided "the
narrow exception to the rule" for two reasons.151 First, the candidate
debate by design is a forum for candidate expression with the purpose
of allowing candidates to share political views with minimal intrusion
or guidance.' 52 Second, the candidate debate plays a heightened role
in the electoral process as it significantly impacts the electorate in
evaluating the candidates' positions and competence.153 Accordingly,
the candidate debates lend themselves to scrutiny under the forum
doctrine'54 and are not subject only to the public interest standard.
Having decided that political debates warrant heightened editorial
scrutiny, the Supreme Court turned its attention to whether the debate
consisted of a traditional, designated, or nonpublic forum.'55
147. See id. at 1638-44.
148. Id. at 1640-41 (noting that candidate debates are "different from other
programming").
149. See id. at 1639-40. The Court stated that "broad rights of access for outside
speakers would be antithetical . . . to the discretion that stations and their editorial staff
must exercise . . ." Id. at 1639. Additionally, the Court cited the broad discretion
usually afforded broadcasters by the courts, and the broadcaster's duty to serve the public
interest as the rationales for disallowing third-party claims of access under the public
forum precedents. See id. at 1639-40.
150. See id. at 1639 (positing that editorial discretion generally "counsels against
subjecting broadcasters to claims of viewpoint discrimination"). While the majority
noted that public broadcasters applying editorial discretion engage in "speech activity,"
the Court also stated that scrutiny under the forum doctrine unjustifiably interferes with a
broadcasters' purposes. See id. at 1639-40.
151. Id. at 1640.
152. See id.
153. See id. The Court stated that:
[D]ebates are regarded as the 'only occasion during a campaign when the
attention of a large portion of the American public is focused on the election,
as well as the only campaign information format which potentially offers
sufficient time to explore issues and policies in depth in a neutral forum.'
Id. (quoting CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., CAMPAIGN DEBATES IN PRESIDENTIAL
GENERAL ELECTIONS (summary) (June 15, 1993)); see also supra notes 77-79 and
accompanying text (elaborating on the importance of elections).
154. See Forbes I1, 118 S. Ct. at 1640-41.
1 55. See id. at 1641. The Court provided a very succinct overview of its precedential
discussions of the forum doctrine. See id. The Court stated:
[T]raditional public fora are open for expressive activity regardless of the
government's intent . . . . The government is free to open additional
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After reviewing the First Amendment public forum doctrine, the
Court specifically narrowed the issue to whether the debate was either
a designated public or nonpublic forum. 5 6 The Court distinguished
the two fora by focusing on the intent of the state actor in creating the
forum. 57 If the government intended to make the property "generally
available," it created a designated public forum. 58 If instead the
government opened a forum based on "selective access"-in other
words, allowing access to only a certain class of speakers-then the
property was a nonpublic forum. 159 The Court concluded that AETC
did not open the debate generally to all available candidates for the
Arkansas Congressional seat, but instead reserved eligibility for the
debate to selected candidates for the Third Congressional seat. 160
Thus, AETC made "candidate-by-candidate" decisions regarding
which individuals would appear on its debate.' 6' This "selective
access, unsupported by evidence of a purposeful
designation for
162
public use, [did] not create a public forum."'
properties for expressive use by the general public or by a particular class of
speakers, thereby creating designated public fora. Where the property is not
traditional public forum and the government has not chosen to create a
designated public forum, the property is either a nonpublic forum or not a
forum at all.
Id.
156. Id. at 1641-42 (noting that the Court agreed with the parties that "the AETC
debate was not a traditional public forum").
157. See id. Here, the Supreme Court's analysis differed from the approach of the
Eighth Circuit, which focused its analysis on the nature of the expressive activity. See
supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit court's approach). The
Court found that the university in Widmar expressly created a forum "generally open" to
registered student groups. See id. (interpreting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 26768 (1981)). On the other hand, the Court determined that the government in Perry and
Cornelius intended the forum for only parties that received permission, and the Court
found that this "selective access" formed a nonpublic forum. See id.(citing Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 805 (1985); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)); see also supra notes 86,
89 (discussing Cornelius and Perry, respectively, in more detail) and Part II.D
(discussing the public forum doctrine).
158. See Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 1642. While the Supreme Court in Forbes 117 cited
to Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804-05, the Court first created the distinction between general
and "selective access" in Perry. Perry, 460 U.S. at 47. The Court, however, more clearly
set forth this distinction as the key determination in Forbes III. See Forbes 111, 118 S.
Ct. at 1642.
159. See Forbes III, 118 S. Ct. at 1642.
160. See id.
161. See id.at 1642-43. The Court compared this to its decision in Cornelius where
the Government made agency by agency determinations as to which of the eligible
agencies would participate in a charity drive.
See id.; supra notes 86-88 and
accompanying text (discussing Cornelius in greater detail).
162. See id.at 1643 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805).
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Once the Court classified the forum as nonpublic, it turned to the
"reasonable" and "viewpoint neutral" standard to decide the case.' 63
Justice Kennedy found the decision to exclude Forbes to be viewpoint
neutral by citing the jury's finding that the exclusion was not based on
objections to Forbes' opposing viewpoints." Additionally, the Court
found reasonableness in the testimony of AETC Executive Director
Susan Howarth that she excluded Forbes because his candidacy lacked
real public interest. 165 Thus, Justice Kennedy asserted that Forbes'
minimal objective support justified his exclusion, and the Court
reversed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit."
C. The Dissent
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, expressed
disapproval with the majority's conclusion because AETC's exclusion
of Forbes conflicted with "well-settled constitutional principles" that
the majority neglected. 167 Justice Stevens explained that the AETC's
decision raised "precisely the concerns addressed by 'the many
decisions of this Court over the last 30 years, holding that a law
subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior
standards
restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite
68
unconstitutional."",1
is
authority,
licensing
to guide the
The dissent emphasized three issues that the majority failed to
address in its decision. 169 The dissent first explained that certain facts
in the record reflected the subjective nature of the decision by
163. See id. at 1644. The Eighth Circuit, having found a designated public forum,
erroneously applied the higher compelling interest standard. See Forbes H, 93 F.3d
497, 504-05 (8th Cir. 1996).
164. See Forbes III, 118 S.Ct. at 1643.
165. See id. at 1644. She testified that Forbes was excluded
because (1)"the Arkansas voters did not consider him a serious candidate"; (2)
"the news organizations also did not consider him a serious candidate"; (3)
"the Associated Press and a national election result reporting service did not
plan to run his name in results on election night"; (4) Forbes "apparently had
little, if any, financial support, failing to report campaign finances to the
Secretary of State's office or to the Federal Election Commission"; and (5)
"there [was] no "Forbes for Congress" campaign headquarters other than his
house."
Id. at 1643-44 (citing Appeal to Pet. for Cert. 23a, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n.
v. Forbes, 118 S.Ct. 1633 (1998) (No. 96-779)).
166. See id. at 1644. The Court did not address 47 U.S.C. § 315's equal opportunity
requirement because Forbes earlier dropped his statutory claim. See id. at 1638-39.
167. See id. at 1644 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
168. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S.
147, 150-51 (1969)).
169. See id. at 1644-49 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
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AETC.170 AETC's flexibility in discarding these facts, which proved
that Forbes may have had stronger support than indicated, and that
Forbes' exclusion may have affected the outcome of the debate,
reflected the "virtually limitless" discretion afforded the staff of the
station.' 7 1 The dissent supported the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that
AETC's determination of "'political viability' was.., so susceptible
of variation in individual opinion, as to provide no secure basis for the
exercise of governmental
power consistent with the First
72
Amendment."1
The dissent also disapproved of the Court's understatement of the
importance of the differences between state and private ownership of
broadcast networks. 173 Justice Stevens acknowledged that the
majority implicitly indicated that the AETC staff members were
government employees, but he doubted whether the Court understood
the significance of the distinction between public and private broadcast
facilities. 74 Congress specifically chose a system of private
broadcasters licensed by the government in large part because of the
risks of government censorship created by public ownership. 175 Thus,
the dissent asserted that while the First Amendment does not constrict
a private station's journalistic freedom, it does place certain limitations
on a state-owned network because the "political content of [the
station's] programs necessarily increases the risk of government
censorship and propaganda in a way that protection of privately owned
broadcasters does not."' 76
170. See id. at 1644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17 1. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent first points out that Forbes had
been a serious contender for the Republican nomination for Lieutenant Governor in
1986 and 1990. See id. at 1644-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In a three-way primary
race just two years prior to AETC's decision, Forbes received 46.88% of the vote and
carried 15 of the 16 counties in the Third Congressional District by absolute majorities.
See id. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Further, despite the AETC's potentially correct
conclusion that Forbes was not a serious candidate, the station's decision may have
affected the outcome of the election as the Republican winner of the Third District
Congressional race garnered only 50.22% of the vote to the Democrat's 47.20%. See id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. See id. at 1644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 1646 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
175. See id. (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
176. Id. at 1647 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent also discussed the one time
that the Supreme Court previously considered whether public stations may exercise the
same journalistic freedom as private stations. See id. at 1646 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In FCC v. League of Women Voters, the Court held that a statute forbidding stations
receiving federal money from "editorializing" was invalid because it even prohibited
certain speech by private networks. See id. at 1646-47 (Stevens, J.,dissenting)
(interpreting FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 395 (1984)). The Court,

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 30

Additionally, the dissenting justices disagreed with the majority's
acceptance of AETC's arbitrary method of defining the scope of the
debate. 177 The dissent emphasized the well-settled principle that once a
state actor opens a limited forum and exposes itself to First
Amendment scrutiny, the State must respect the boundaries it has
' As a result, the dissent articulated that "[t]he dispositive issue
set. "78
in this case, then, is not whether AETC created a designated public
forum or a nonpublic forum, as the Court concludes, but whether
AETC defined the contours of the debate forum with sufficient
179
specificity to justify the exclusion of a ballot-qualified candidate."'
The dissent endorsed the Supreme Court's position in Shuttlesworth
v. City of Birmingham180 as the appropriate measuring stick for
AETC's exclusion of Forbes. 8 ' In Shuttlesworth, the Court
considered the constitutionality of a city ordinance requiring groups
participating in a parade, procession, or other public demonstration to
obtain a permit from the City Commission.' 82 Because the Supreme
Court considered picketing and parading as methods of expression, the
Court determined that the ordinance must survive First Amendment

however, reserved decision on the constitutionality of a proposed ban concerning only
stations owned by the state. See id. at 1647 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing League
of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 394 n.24).
177. See id. at 1647 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent mainly opposed the
subjective considerations of a candidate's "viability" or "newsworthiness," which both
provide the broadcaster wide discretion in making candidate decisions. See id. at 1648
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. See id. at 1647 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). By relying on
Shuttlesworth and Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992), the
dissent applied a standard to broadcasters that it had not previously used in any decisions
regarding either public or private broadcast rights. See Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 1648-49
(Stevens, J., dissenting); supra Part II (discussing the evolution of broadcasting rights).
The dissent based this analysis on the similarity between the government's discretion in
granting licenses to certain individuals and the public station's discretion in allowing
access to debates. See Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 1648-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. See Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 1648-49.
182. See Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 148. On Friday, April 12, 1963, 52 people
marched from a Birmingham, Alabama church to protest the denial of civil rights to
African Americans in the city. See id. at 148-49. After they marched four blocks in an
orderly fashion along the sidewalks, the marchers were stopped and arrested by
Birmingham police for violating Section 1159 of the Birmingham code, which outlaws
public processions without the prior issuance of a permit. See id. at 149. The Court
found that Shuttlesworth, one of the three ministers leading the protest, could not be
punished due to his protected right of assembly and political expression because the
statute did not provide an expedited process capable of handling license requests of this
manner. See id. at 163-64.
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scrutiny.18 The Court felt that the ordinance "fell squarely within the
ambit of the many decisions of this Court over the last 30 years,
holding that a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective,
to guide the licensing authority, is
and definite standards
84
unconstitutional." 1
The dissent noted that AETC clearly violated this constitutional85
requirement, as no written criteria directed the staff's discretion.
Instead, the staff's exclusion of Forbes rested on the subjective criteria
of "viability" or "newsworthiness.' 8 6 As a result of the AETC's
"wholly subjective" decision, the dissent reaffirmed its position that it
was "convinced" that the Constitution demands access to political
debates sponsored by
public stations "be governed by pre-established,
87
objective criteria."1
IV. ANALYSIS
Although the Supreme Court correctly followed precedent in its
analysis, the Court failed to set forth adequate guidelines for public
television stations and other state actors by only requiring that
exclusions be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. 88 This standard
ignores the constitutional imperatives that previously influenced the
Court when it required "that access to political debates planned and
managed by state-owned entities be governed by pre-established,
objective criteria. ' 89 Such objective criteria would help decrease the
risks of excluding candidates from public fora that inherently stem
from a governmentally-sponsored debate.' 90

183. See id. at 152.
184. Id. at 150-51; see Forbes III, 118 S. Ct. at 1648 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
Supreme Court reaffirmed this approach in Forsyth Count) v. Nationalist Movement,
when the Court considered the constitutionality of a similar ordinance allowing an
official the discretion to determine the amount of the permit fee. 505 U.S. 123, 126-27
(1992); see Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 1648 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Because no
objective factors guided the administrator in price setting, the Court concluded that the
"First Amendment prohibits the vesting of such unbridled discretion in a government
official." Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 133.
185. See Forbes I1, 118 S. Ct. at 1648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 1649-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. See id. at 1644-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 1649-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. See id. at 1650 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court ProperlyApplied FirstAmendment Scrutiny
to Debates
The Supreme Court's analysis of the public forum doctrine
sufficiently justified the Court's decision to apply the doctrine to public
broadcasters' decisions in the arena of political debates.' 9 ' While
some courts have either questioned the public forum doctrine's
applicability to media or ignored it altogether,19 the Supreme Court
accepted the doctrine, but only under the very narrow circumstances of
a political candidate debate.' 93 In so limiting the doctrine, the Court
relied upon both the exceptional significance of debates in the election
process and a debate's very nature as a forum for controversial
political speech. 94
As a result of its decision to apply First Amendment scrutiny to
political debates, the Court avoided specific application of either the
public interest standard or the equal opportunity standard of § 315 of
the Communications Act. 95 The Supreme Court's use of the public
forum doctrine over either the public interest or equal opportunity
standard reflects the need for heightened scrutiny in the sensitive area
of political debates.196 That the public interest standard does little to
address the particular inherent dangers of publicly broadcast political
debates can be seen in the FCC's license renewal policies. 97 While
broadcasters maintain that the public interest standard adequately
serves its purpose because the potential punishment is termination of
the license,' 98 the FCC has not found that a broadcaster violated the
public's interest in twenty years.' 99 Clearly, the FCC's regulatory
powers pack more bark than bite. 2" The Court's decision in Arkansas
A.

191. See id. at 1639-41.
192. See id. at 1648 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (indicating that televised debates "may
not squarely fit within our public forum analysis"). See generally Chandler v. Georgia
Pub. Telecomm. Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir. 1990) (avoiding the public forum
analysis by endorsing the public interest standard).
193. See Forbes III, 118 S. Ct. at 1640.
194. See id.
195. See supra Part II.A (discussing both the public interest standard and § 315).
196. For the Supreme Court's reasoning that a heightened level of scrutiny need be
applied to public station debates, see supra Part III.B.
197. See Ackley, supra note 27, at 494.
198. See id. (citing In re Comm'n Policy in Enforcing § 312(a)(7) of the
Communications Act, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1080-81 (1978)).
199. See id. (citing Reed E. Hundt, The Public's Airwaves: What Does the Public
Interest Require of Television Broadcasters?,45 DuKE L.J. 1089, 1094 (1996)).
200. See generally Hundt, supra note 199, at 1094. Hundt notes that in the renewal
proceedings conducted every five years, the FCC has renewed almost all broadcast
licenses three times without a single revocation. See id.
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Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,20 1 however, while

sidestepping the public interest standard in the area of political debates,
maintained the integrity of that standard as the governing tool for all
other aspects of broadcasting regulation. °2
The Court avoided the equal opportunity standard of § 315 as well
because Forbes abandoned his statutory claim.2 °3 The statute
mandates broadcasters to provide political candidates equal air-time
opportunities, 2°4 but it only triggers a candidate's right to be heard if a
station first provides another candidate access to its station.205 Forbes
dropped the claim because the Eighth Circuit previously ruled that
there is no private cause of action to enforce § 315.206 The proper
procedure for such action is to bring the claim through the FCC, and
Forbes failed to exhaust these administrative remedies. 2 7 Thus, while
the Supreme Court and the circuit court found that Forbes could not
rely on § 315, they did not eliminate the provision's ability to govern
candidate debates on public television stations.20 8
B. Clarifying the DistinctionBetween a DesignatedPublic Forum and
a Nonpublic Forum

The Supreme Court determined that a public television sponsored
debate qualified as a nonpublic forum and, as such, the AETC's
decision to deny Forbes access need only be reasonable and viewpoint
201. Forbes III, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998); see supra Part III.B.
202. See Forbes I1, 118 S. Ct. at 1639 (stating that "broad rights of access for
outside speakers would be antithetical, as a general rule, to the discretion that stations
and their editorial staff must exercise to fulfill their journalistic purpose and statutory
obligations").
203. See id., 118 S. Ct. at 1638-39.
204. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a); see also supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text
(discussing requirements of § 315).
205. See ANDREW 0. SHAPIRO, MEDIA ACCESS: YOUR RIGHTS TO EXPRESS YOUR VIEWS
ON RADIO AND TELEVISION 51 (1976). Certain instances, such as news coverage of a

candidate, do not qualify for the statute's protection. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a).
Broadcaster sponsorship of a debate, however, does trigger § 315 and subjects the
broadcaster to the equal time provision. See DeYoung v. Patten, 898 F.2d 628, 633 (8th
Cir. 1990). A public station may typically meet the statutory requirement by offering
the candidate a chance to air his or her views on alternative programming. See Marcus v.
Iowa Pub. Television, 97 F.3d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir. 1996).
206. See Forbes 1, 22 F.3d 1423, 1427 (8th Cir. 1994).
207. See id.
208. See Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 1638-39; Forbes 1, 22 F.3d at 1427. The Supreme
Court's decision allows candidates two potential remedies. First, a third-party candidate
may gain access to the debate itself if the broadcaster's decision to stage a two candidate
debate is not reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. See Forbes I1, 118 S. Ct. at 1643.
Second, if a court finds the decision conformed with the First Amendment, the candidate
may appear on another program offered by the station. See Marcus, 97 F.3d at 1139.
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neutral. 20 9 The Court based this decision on the "selective" nature of
the forum. 2 ° The station invited only candidates for the Third
Congressional District seat and then determined participation on a
candidate-by-candidate basis, thus, the station engaged in a process of
selective access.211 Consequently, the debate was not open generally
to any person qualified as a bona fide candidate and it constituted a
nonpublic forum.21 2
The Court created the distinction between selective and general
access in an attempt to provide a clearer direction for both the lower
courts and public television stations to follow. 2 13 The Court's
distinction, however, serves only to muddle the differences between
the designated public forum and the nonpublic forum and increases the
likelihood that candidates will be arbitrarily excluded from debates.21 4
By emphasizing that a state actor creates a designated public forum by
limiting access to a "particular class of speakers," the Court created a
rule ripe for manipulation by the government. 215 For instance, while
the AETC's selectivity created a nonpublic forum, one could argue that
the AETC instead created a designated public forum because it did
invite the whole class of "viable" or "newsworthy" candidates. 1 6 As
Justice Stevens noted with irony in the dissenting opinion, "it is the
standardless character of the decision to exclude Forbes that provides
debates were a nonpublic
the basis for the Court's conclusion that the
' 2 17
forum.
public
limited
a
than
forum rather
Additionally, the Supreme Court's distinction between limited and
nonpublic fora effectively eliminates any purpose that a designated
public forum originally served.21 8 Under the Court's interpretation, a
station creates a nonpublic forum by simply excluding a candidate,
giving rise to a lesser scrutiny and making it easier to justify the
exclusion in the first place. 2 9 Accordingly, the difference between
209. See Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 1643.
210. See id. at 1642-43.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. For the full discussion of the difference between limited public and
nonpublic fora, see supra Part II.D.
214. See Forbes II1, 118 S.Ct. at 1649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. See id. at 1642.
216. See id. at 1649 n.18 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
217. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. See supra Part II.D (presenting the differences between the types of fora).
219. See Forbes 111, 118 S.Ct. at 1642. The Court noted that "the government does
not create a designated public forum when it does no more than reserve eligibility for
access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose members must then, as
individuals, 'obtain permission' to use it." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Cornelius v.
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selective access and general access stems from whether the state actor
qualifies the availability of the forum to those within a certain class.22 °
Consequently, the government, or more particularly, a public television station, may constitutionally deny an individual access to a
forum by simply making it clear that only certain individuals will be
granted access.221
Thus, any time the government hopes to avoid the stricter First
Amendment scrutiny applied to a designated public forum, the actor
need only assert that members of the class must in a sense "obtain
permission. 2 2 2 As a result, only two categories of public fora truly
exist-the traditional public forum and the nonpublic forum. 223 The
Court needs to clearly acknowledge that its decision restructured the
forum doctrine or it must establish a better
system for distinguishing
224
forum.
nonpublic
and
limited
between
C. For All Types of Fora,The HeightenedRole of Debates Requires
"Pre-established,Objective Criteria"
The Supreme Court properly applied First Amendment scrutiny to
public television debates and, despite the inadequacies of the Supreme
Court's public forum analysis in Forbes III, the forum doctrine will
continue guiding public television stations in the future. 225 By
endorsing this doctrine without a consideration of other First
Amendment principles, the Court avoided a clear opportunity to
provide a stricter standard in an arena that will only grow in
importance in the coming years.2 26
1. The Shuttlesworth Decision Demands the Court's Attention
In Forbes III, the Supreme Court's major failure did not result from
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804 (1985)).
220. See id.at 1642.

221. See id.
222. See id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804 (1985)).

223. While designated fora still exist, state actors will be tempted to limit access to a
forum simply to avoid the higher First Amendment scrutiny associated with a designated
public forum. Thus, the government's decision need only be reasonable and viewpointneutral instead of narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interest. See supra Part
II.D (discussing fora and attendant levels of scrutiny).
224. The Supreme Court does recognize that the government controls whether it will
designate the forum for a particular class but it does not address the effect this distinction
will have on the forum analysis itself. See Forbes I, 118 S.Ct. at 1642.
225. See supra Part IV.A-B (explaining the Supreme Court's use of the forum doctrine
and the problems with it in the context of political debates).
226. See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the importance of political debates in the
current climate).
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the public forum analysis itself.2 2 7 Rather, in its decision to ignore
established precedent set in Shuttlesworth,2 2 8 the Court granted too
much freedom to public television stations and it provided little
direction for courts in their future decisions concerning the choices of
state actors in televised debates.22 9
As the Forbes dissent noted, AETC's control over the debate and
the selection of candidates closely paralleled the authority of the City
Commission over those applying for a license to use the public
facilities for expressive purposes in Shuttlesworth.2 3 ° Consequently,
just as the Court required "narrow, objective, and definite standards"
as a guide for a licensing official's decisions, so should the Court have
placed this burden upon public television stations in order to direct
broadcaster decisions affecting a political candidates' First Amendment
rights. 1 While the public forum doctrine is useful for determining the
level of scrutiny applied to broadcaster decisions, the doctrine fails to
give any guidance to broadcasters who wish to survive the applied
scrutiny.2 3 2 Once the Court decided upon the correct forum
classification and judicial scrutiny, the Court should have heeded its
own mandate from Shuttlesworth and set forth definite standards to
survive First Amendment scrutiny.2 33 Instead, the Court applied only
the public forum analysis without any justification for ignoring the
mandates of the Shuttlesworth decision.2 34
Justice Stevens addressed this concern in the dissent when he
supported the need for "pre-established, objective criteria" because of
the very subjective nature of the decisions by the AETC staff.235 For
227. See supra Part III.B (discussing the Supreme Court's public forum analysis).
228. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969). This
precedent requires "narrow, objective, and definite standards." Id.
229. Compare Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 1643-44, with Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 164445 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (showing how the majority and dissenting opinions used
different facts surrounding the Arkansas election to support opposing positions).
230. See Forbes III, 118 S. Ct. at 1647-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a more
thorough discussion of Shuttlesworth, see supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
231. See Forbes III, 118 S. Ct. at 1649. The dissent also notes the disparity between
the majority's standard and the rules governing a privately owned network when airing a
debate. See id. at 1645. Private stations are subject to the Federal Election Campaign
Act unless the network uses "pre-established, objective criteria" when choosing
candidates for debate. See id. (quoting 11 CFR § 110.13(c) (1997)).
232. The public forum analysis calls for either the broadcast decision to serve a
compelling state interest or to be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral, depending on the
forum, see supra Part II.B, but it does not indicate to the broadcaster any specific criteria
that must be met by its debate decisions.
233. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1968).
234. See Forbes 11I, 118 S. Ct. at 1641-43.
235. See id. at 1645.
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instance, the majority cited the testimony of AETC's Executive
Director in support of its decision that Forbes' exclusion was
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.236 The director testified that the
station excluded Forbes because he had no official headquarters, he
raised little in financial support, and the Arkansas voters and broadcast
media did not consider him a serious candidate.237 Conversely, the
dissenting opinion emphasized different statistics, such as Forbes'
serious past contention for the Republican nomination for Lieutenant
Governor and the subsequent close election result in the 1992 Third
Congressional District race, as support for the claim that AETC's
decision was arbitrary and in violation of the First Amendment.238
Thus, depending upon what particular set of statistics a public station
endorses, a court could find that the public station's motivations
constituted either a violation of the candidate's First Amendment rights
or a reasonable, sound example of journalistic discretion.239
In addition to curbing arbitrary government decisions, preestablished, objective criteria create a clear, easily-evaluated standard
for court scrutiny.24 ° If AETC employees, for example, established
criteria for their decision in advance, then the Supreme Court could
have focused its analysis on whether the criteria were reasonable and
viewpoint-neutral rather than on which set of facts should be
emphasized in its analysis. 24 ' Thus, the public stations and the courts
236. See id. at 1643-44.
237. See id.; supra note 165 (listing the five reasons for Forbes' exclusion). The
dissent found AETC's reliance on Forbes' lack of financial support particularly
troublesome. See Forbes III, 118 S. Ct. at 1648. AETC used this as evidence that Forbes
lacked viability when it could have been a "reason for allowing him to share a free forum
with wealthier candidates." Id. Thus, the majority relied on factors that arguably favor
inclusion as support for excluding Forbes. See id.
238. See id. at 1644-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra note 171 (providing specific,
statistical evidence supporting Forbes' legitimacy).
239. See Forbes III, at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens states that
"the facts in the record presumably would have provided an adequate basis either for a
decision to include Forbes in the Third District debate or a decision to exclude him ......
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240. It stands to reason that if the dissent's suggested pre-established, objective
criteria will curtail arbitrary exclusions by state actors, the criteria will also provide a
specific, accessible source for judicial examination when a station's decisions come
before the judiciary.
24 1. The negative effects of the arbitrary difference between a designated public
forum and a nonpublic forum become less magnified if stations established these
objective criteria. See supra Part IV.B (describing the arbitrary result of the Supreme
Court's public forum analysis). Although the reasonable, viewpoint-neutral standard for
public stations is a lower threshold than the strict scrutiny applies to designated fora,
this lower threshold allows less room for manipulation if the stations must create preestablished criteria.
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will not be tempted to engage in the type of statistical wrangling
evident in the two different sets of facts considered by the majority and
dissenting opinions of the Court.242
2. Objective Criteria Sufficiently Addresses Majority's Fears
Both the Supreme Court in Forbes and the Eleventh Circuit in
Chandlerexpressed a similar concern regarding limitations on public
broadcasters. 243 The Supreme Court opposed the idea of an all-ornothing rule where a station either opens the forum to all interested
candidates or does not open the forum at all. 244 The Court feared that
with "the prospect of cacophony, on the one hand, and First
Amendment liability on the other, a public television broadcaster might
choose not to air candidates' views at all., 24 5 Accordingly, as a means
of encouraging debates and allowing public broadcasters greater
flexibility, the Court determined that candidate debates qualify as a
nonpublic fora.246
Constitutionally mandated, pre-established standards, however,
present no such problem.2 47 If a public station satisfies its First
Amendment duties simply by establishing qualification requirements
before opening the forum, it maintains indirect control over the
eligibility of candidates and prevents the potential cacophony of an allor-nothing rule. 248 Thus, under the Shuttlesworth standard, public
stations would most likely continue airing debates.24 9
D. Suggestionsfor the Legislature
The dissent's argument in favor of requiring stations to develop pre242. Compare Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 1643-44, with Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 164445 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the majority and dissenting opinions use different facts
surrounding the Arkansas election to support opposing positions).
243. See Forbes I11,118 S. Ct. at 1642-43; Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecomm.
Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486, 489-90 (11 th Cir. 1990); see also Part II.E (explaining the
Chandler court's position).
244. See Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 1642.
245. Id. at 1643. The Court provided a concrete example of this concern. See id. As
a result of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Forbes H, a Nebraska public station canceled a
debate between candidates for the United States Senate in 1996. See id.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 1649 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens specifically
responded to the majority's concern with the Nebraska debate by asserting that the
Nebraska station would not have chosen to cancel the debate if it only had to set
standards before the debate. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248. See id. at 1649-50. (Stevens, J.,dissenting). This presumes, of course, the
criteria are constitutionally sound.
249. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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established, objective criteria does not solve the problem entirely.25 °
The individual stations retain the license to create criteria at their
discretion, and the networks could easily establish rules that infringe
upon the First Amendment rights of candidates."' Consequently,
courts may still have to decide whether the criteria fulfills its First
Amendment obligations. 2
Based on the facts considered by both the majority and the dissent in
Forbes, however, public stations may compile a list of factors that
ensure only "newsworthy" candidates will qualify while satisfying the
restrictions of the public forum doctrine.253 As possible criteria, a
station could require in any combination that: (1) the candidate must
qualify for the ballot; 254 (2) the candidate must have a history of
serious political involvement; 255 (3) the candidate can sustain the
attention of the voters due to his or her repute or past involvement in
political affairs; 25 6 or (4) the electorate considers the person a serious
candidate.2 57

While the first criteria certainly must be met, the remaining
standards are subject to different interpretations by individual public
250. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the idea that the First Amendment requirement of
pre-established, objective criteria and the public forum doctrine both should govern
political candidate debates). The dissent implicitly acknowledged this as well because it
only mentions that televised debates "may not squarely fit within our public forum
analysis" without completely rejecting the public forum doctrine. Forbes III, 118 S. Ct.
at 1648-49. The fact that the dissent endorses the Shuttlesworth standard while not
directly rejecting the public forum doctrine reflects the idea that they may both govern
debates.
251. See supra note 250 (discussing potential coexistence of the public forum
analysis and the Shuttlesworth standard).
252. See Paul, supra note 19, at 787-88 (stating that over time the common law will
develop precedents that will make subsequent rules regulating debates less arbitrary).
Paul recommends certain rules but he does so in the context of his suggested 28th
Amendment. See id.
253. See supra notes 165, 171 (discussing the facts cited by the majority and
dissent).
254. See Paul, supra note 19, at 785-86 ("Candidates who have not crossed the
minimum threshold of ballot access are presumptively excluded.").
255. See Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 1644-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent used
Forbes' political history as evidence of his viability. See id. Justice Stevens noted that
he carried 46.88% of the statewide vote in a three-way primary election for the
Republican nomination for Lieutenant Governor in 1990. See id.
256. See Paul, supra note 19, at 787. Professor Paul suggested that debates include
anyone with "a realistic chance of winning or a potential to capture sustained attention."
Id. He believed this standard will avoid embarrassments such as the 1996 decision to
exclude Ross Perot from a presidential debate when Perot garnered 19% of the vote. See
id.
257. See Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 1643. The majority includes this as one of the five
factors considered by AETC in its decision to exclude Forbes. See id.
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stations or government committees. 581 For instance, a station could
more specifically define the second standard by requiring that the
candidate must have run for political office in the past and garnered a
certain percentage of the vote.25 9 The fourth criteria may also have a
specific percentage attached as evidence that the candidate at least
commands the respect of a certain percentage of the voters. 260 Note,
however, that only the first factor should be dispositive; therefore, a
loophole in a given factor would not provide a station a justification for
rejecting a candidate. 26 Regardless, any criteria that a station creates
will likely be subject to further interpretation by the courts until
precedent dictates how far a station may go.262
V.

IMPACT

Protected by the broad standard embraced by the Supreme Court, a
Minnesota public television station could have sponsored a debate and
denied now-Governor Ventura participation if the station supported its
decision with the type of inconclusive statistical evidence offered by
AETC against Forbes.263 Ironically, Ventura benefited greatly from a
258. See Paul, supra note 19, at 786 (suggesting that for presidential elections, a
commission could be appointed by Congress to determine the guidelines, and that
individual states could create their own election commissions for other offices).
259. See Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct. at 1644-45; see also supra note 171 (discussing
Forbes' support in the 1990 race for Lieutenant Governor). The statistics supporting
Forbes' limited success in past debates provide an example from which an initial
standard of "serious political involvement" could be created. See Forbes 111, 118 S. Ct.
at 1645.
260. This suggestion arises from the ambiguous nature of the requirement that the
"electorate consider the person a serious candidate." See supra note 165 and
accompanying text (stating the majority reliance on evidence that the media and
electorate did not view Forbes as a serious candidate). The ceiling should be low,
perhaps 10%, because debates often serve as an impetus for campaign success. See
Smith, supra note 2, at 7 (stating that Ventura's success in the first debate on October 1
started his rise in the polls).
261. For instance, the second suggested factor relies on past political involvement.
See supra text accompanying note 254. This could hinder a candidate's possible debate
participation if running for the first time, but it should not eliminate the candidate's
opportunity.
262. See Paul, supra note 19, at 787-88. The criteria likely will pass First
Amendment scrutiny. The Supreme Court in Forbes III required that debate decisions
only be viewpoint-neutral and reasonable. See supra Part III.B (discussing evidence that
the decision to exclude Forbes was viewpoint-neutral and reasonable). Because a station
would develop the criteria in advance, a court would likely find that the standards do not
reflect the stations views. Thus, if the criteria are reasonable, they will survive First
Amendment scrutiny.
263. See supra note 165 (discussing statistical evidence presented). Minneapolis
station KTCA-KTCI sponsored three candidate debates before the election, and they
included Governor Ventura. See Telephone Interview with Bill Handley, Vice President
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series of debates held as a result of the work of Minnesota Compact, a
group working for improving campaigns.264 Under the Forbes
decision, however, a public television station could have2 6excluded
5
Ventura if it used some of the statistical evidence as support.
In Ventura's case, the very debates from which he may now have
been easily excluded were a great source of his success.266 Ventura's

campaign started slowly and truly did not begin acquiring momentum
until the months immediately preceding the election.267 Ventura did
not announce his candidacy until January 27, 1998, and as late as midSeptember, banks were reluctant to give him loans because they were
not convinced that he would get the 5% of the vote necessary to
qualify for public money so the loan could be repaid. 268 After the first
debate on October 1, his poll numbers began climbing, increasing
from 10% on September 23 to 21% on October 19.269 With the
additional help of a late, ingenious ad campaign funded by the bank
loan, Ventura won the election, garnering 37% of the vote to
Republican Norm Coleman's 34% and Minnesota Attorney General
Hubert H. Humphrey III's 28%.27°

Based on these facts, a Minnesota public station could have made a
strong case for Ventura's early exclusion. For instance, four of the
of Minnesota Production in Minneapolis, Minn. (Mar. 22, 1999). Regardless, whether
or not a Minnesota public television station aired a debate involving Ventura, the
station retained the constitutional right to deny him access. See infra Part V (discussing
the use of statistics to legitimize a candidate).
264. See Smith, supra note 2, at 3. The chairman of Ventura's staff, Dean Barkley,
agreed to co-direct the Minnesota Compact, which worked to specifically improve 1998
campaigns. See id. The Compact focused on debates among other things, and Barkley
used his position to open the debates to Reform Party candidates. See id.
265. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with
using statistical evidence to support a station's decision).
266. See Smith, supra note 2, at 7. Dean Barkley, campaign chairperson, said that
"Jesse hits a home run in [the first debate of the general election in] Brainerd [Oct. 1] and
his poll numbers start climbing as a result." Id.
267. See id. at 6. The Ventura campaign had only $12,000 in July, 1998, and it
wasn't until Ventura raised over $50,000 in August through fund-raising that the
campaign qualified for the $327,000 in public money. See id.
268. See id. at 6-7. Because financial institutions hesitated to lend Ventura money,
the campaign's attempt to air a series of television ads almost failed. See id. at 6. To
secure the loan, the campaign procured insurance as collateral in case Ventura did not
receive 5% of the vote. See id. Additionally, the campaign officers appealed to all of
the State's Reform Party members to help in the search for a bank, and eventually
succeeded through the last minute efforts of Minneapolis council member Steve Minn.
See id. at 7.
269. See Smith, supra note 16, at 6. Ventura's poll numbers increased to 27% in the
days leading up to the election. See id.
270. See Belluck, supra note 1, at 1-2.
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five reasons cited by AETC to exclude Forbes applied to Ventura.2 7 '
Three of the reasons dealt with whether Arkansas voters and media
considered Forbes a serious candidate.272 Applying the "serious
candidate" criterion to Ventura, a station could have excluded Ventura
with the September 19 poll as support.273 Just as AETC emphasized
Forbes' limited financial support,274 a Minnesota public station clearly
could have relied on Ventura's continual struggle to raise money as a
reason to deny him access. 275 Additionally, the station could rely on
other factors such as his late entrance onto the political scene, his
sensationalist campaign style, and the lending institutions' lack of faith
in his campaign as justifications for excluding Ventura.276
Consequently, just as AETC's exclusion of Forbes survived First
Amendment scrutiny, so too would a station's exclusion of Ventura.277
Ventura won the election, however, and therefore he necessarily
should have been involved in any debate between the gubernatorial
candidates.27 8

It is easy to see how a Minnesota public television station could
271. See Forbes I1, 118 S. Ct. at 1643-44; see also supra note 165 (setting forth
determining factors). AETC also mentioned that Forbes did not have a campaign
headquarters other than his house. See Forbes I1, 118 S. Ct. at 1644. Ventura's
campaign was more organized, as he had a team and a specific game plan designed by he
and his campaign coordinator. See Smith, supra note 2, at 2.
272. See Smith, supra note 2, at 2.
273. This information may not even be necessary to support a station's claim. Dean
Barkley, the campaign manager, arranged most of the debates during the spring and
summer of 1998. See id. at 3. Since the debates were arranged so far in advance, a
stations judgment would have to be even more subjective than if the decision were made
in the weeks immediately preceding the debate.
274. See Forbes II1, 118 S. Ct. at 1644-45; see also supra note 165 (summarizing the
AETC Director's testimony).
275. See supra notes 165-66 (stating that the majority relied on Forbes' lack of
financial support); Smith, supra note 2, at 5-6.
276. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing factors used to exclude
Forbes); see also infra Part I (discussing Ventura's unorthodox, less serious campaign
style).
277. See supra notes 271-76 and accompanying text (discussing the similarities
between the two cases).
278. Ventura benefited from the work of his campaign chairman with the Minnesota
Compact and his subsequent appearances in debates. See Smith, supra note 2, at 3. His
situation, however, was an exception rather than the rule. Most third-party campaigns
do not have the opportunity to benefit from the work of an insider. Even Ross Perot,
who ultimately received 19% of the vote in the 1992 presidential election, could not
gain access to the debates. See Paul, supra note 19, at 787. Additionally, a candidate
with limited finances such as Forbes may rely heavily on the opportunity to appear in a
free debate. See Forbes III, 118 S. Ct. at 1648. Thus, the fact that he would have won
the election even if a station denied him access should not diminish the negative impact
that the Forbes standard could have on other candidates. See id. at 1648-49.
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have included Ventura and still set out criteria limiting the debates to
viable candidates. Of the four criteria suggested," 9 only the question
of whether the electorate considers the candidate a "serious candidate"
could have posed problems for Ventura. 280 But Ventura could have
overcome the suggestion that voters did not consider him a serious
candidate because the debates did not begin in force until October 1, by
which time his campaign had acquired more momentum.2 8'
Consequently, by establishing pre-established, objective criteria before
the campaign, a station would have reasonably included Ventura in a
debate.28 2
The Forbes standard could have another far reaching effect. If
debates are used as a means of campaign finance reform, the Supreme
Court's decision may impact a greater number of debates in the
future. 28 3 For instance, Professor Jeremy Paul suggests in a recent
article that Congress amend the Constitution of the United States to
require candidates to appear before the voters in debates scheduled
close to the election. 84 Because the government in public television is
a state actor, the standard set by the Court in Forbes may also guide
279. See supra Part IV.D (suggesting possible criteria to be adopted by broadcasting

stations).
280. Ventura would could have met the second criteria based on his experience as
mayor of Brooklyn Park, a Minneapolis suburb, from 1991 to 1995. See Ragsdale,
supra note 1, at 6. Ventura also would have qualified for the third criteria, as he certainly

kept the voters' attention throughout the campaign, and he has been well-known figure
in Minnesota due to his time as a wrestler, mayor, and talk-show host. See supra Part I
(describing Ventura's campaign approach).
281. Ventura's momentum began building when he secured the finances necessary to
run the campaign in August and September, 1998. See Smith, supra note 2, at 6-7; supra
notes 267-68 (explaining Ventura's financial difficulties). Thus, a public station
holding a debate just over a month prior to the election would be stretching the "serious
candidate" requirement beyond its limits if it chose to exclude Ventura.
282. See supra note 254 (explaining Professor Paul's criteria for debate candidates).
283. See Paul, supra note 19, at 779-82 (supporting the need for a 28th Amendment);
Foley, supra note 19, at 817-18 (endorsing Paul's plan with changes).
284. See Paul, supra note 19, at 780-84. He believes that required debates even the
playing field for political candidates without potentially infringing on the candidates
First Amendment rights. See id. at 781. This serves as a more moderate and effective
campaign reform than those that may prevent people from buying elections. See id. He
reasons that one way to buy elections involves buying air time to support political
ideas, and this too closely cuts against some free speech ideals. See id. Thus, political
debates level the playing field without restricting political speech. See id. Professor
Edward B. Foley, on the other hand, endorses the Amendment but he also suggests the
debates constitute "all the messages that [the candidates] convey to the electorate in
support of their candidacies during a certain period of time in advance of the election."
Foley, supra note 19, at 818. He supports this with the idea that spending limits do not
limit free speech, but instead are part of the overall effort to structure the public forum
itself. See id. at 819; see also supra Part 1I.D (discussing the public forum doctrine).
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decisions of the government as a result of the proposed amendment.285
While an amendment may not be on the near horizon, the simple fact
that campaign finance reform may lead to an even greater emphasis on
debates requires a stricter standard for public television station
decisions. 286 Thus, the Forbes standard could potentially play a much
larger role in debate decisions in the future, and this further
substantiates the need for an objective standard.287
VI.

CONCLUSION

Public and private broadcasters alike have broad discretion when
selecting and editing programming for stations. Public broadcasters,
however, are government actors. Thus, in the limited circumstances
that their decisions affect whether a candidate may participate in a
televised political debate, their choices require First Amendment
scrutiny. Forbes presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to
establish an objective standard for these scenarios so that broadcaster
choices would protect the integrity of debates while preserving the
candidates' First Amendment rights.
The Court, however, failed to accomplish this task. Instead, the
Court created a subjective standard when it only required that a public
station's exclusion of a candidate be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.
This standard ensures broadcasters' great latitude in their decisions, in
the face of which only blatant bias by a broadcaster would preclude an
exclusion of a candidate. Consequently, through its decision to ignore
precedent and avoid requiring "pre-established, objective criteria," the
Court not only endorsed a standard open to broadcaster manipulation,
but it also essentially closed the door to future third-party candidates
hoping to prove their worth through televised debates.
JAMES

B. TOOHEY

285. See Forbes 11, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1645-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens notes that the Arkansas Educational Television Commission, a state-owned
public television broadcaster, is a state agency whose actions "are fairly attributable to
the State and subject to the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike the actions of privately
owned broadcast licenses." Id. (quoting Forbes 1, 22 F.3d 1423, 1428 (8th Cir. 1994)).
286. See supra note 264 and accompanying text (noting the Minnesota Compact
focused its campaign reform efforts on increasing the quality and number of debates).
287. See supra note 247 (discussing Justice Stevens' position on set standards by
stations).

